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Abstract
Over the past few decades the notion of symmetry has played a major
role in physics and in the philosophy of physics. Philosophers have used
symmetry to discuss the ontology and seeming objectivity of the laws of
physics. We introduce several notions of symmetry in mathematics and
explain how they can also be used in resolving different problems in the
philosophy of mathematics. We use symmetry to discuss the objectivity
of mathematics, the role of mathematical objects, the unreasonable effec-
tiveness of mathematics and the relationship of mathematics to physics.
1 Introduction
A1 philosophical account of the nature of mathematics must answer at least some
of the following questions: First, does mathematics have foundations? If so what
are they? If not, why do some branches of mathematics like set theory appear so
appealing as foundational accounts? Second, why (and when) are mathematical
statements so convincing as compared to other areas of knowledge? Third, how
to explain the apparent objectivity of mathematical discourse? Fourth, What
is the relationship between mathematics and the sciences? Fifth, Why is math-
ematics so effective in the world? Sixth, why do the semantics of mathematics
appear to match the semantics of natural language?
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The account of mathematics we provide in this paper gives a novel and
unified answer to those questions. Our account provides a naturalistic (non-
Realist) conception of mathematics that is sensitive to contemporary mathe-
matical practice. We show how we can address the above questions by thinking
about mathematics as satisfying a certain set of symmetries. Our account relies
on the notions of symmetry that have lately held deep interest for physicists and
philosophers of science who begin by inquiring into what it means for laws of
physics to satisfy symmetries. Typically, a law satisfies a particular symmetry
if it holds despite a change in some parameter of the set of phenomena covered
by the law. We will see examples of this and elaborate in Section 2.
Einstein changed physics forever by taking the idea of symmetry in a novel
direction. He showed that rather than looking for symmetries that given laws
satisfy, physicists should use symmetries to construct the laws of nature, making
symmetry the defining property of laws instead of an accidental feature. These
ideas were taken very seriously by particle physicists. Their search for forces
and particles are essentially searches for various types of symmetries.
Philosophers have used these ideas to guide several topics in the philosophy
of science. In particular, the symmetries explain the seeming objectivity of the
laws of physics. Since the laws of physics are invariant with respect to space,
the laws will be the same wherever they are examined. Since the laws of physics
are invariant with respect to time, they appear timeless and universal. Some
philosophers go further and even question whether the laws of physics actually
exist. They posit that rather than there being laws of physics in nature, the
physicist is really selecting those families of phenomena that seem to be universal
and calling them laws of nature.
Our goal here is to show that this is true for mathematics as well. The
notion of symmetry we focus on we call symmetry of semantics. Mathematical
statements are about abstract or concrete entities of a certain type. Symmetry of
semantics says that if the entities are appropriately exchanged for other entities,
then the truth value of the mathematical statement remains the same. To a
model theorist or a logician this notion is related to validity. Our point is
that this type of validity is a form of symmetry. It allows some aspect of the
mathematical statement to vary while leaving its truth value intact.
Thinking in terms of symmetries will help us deal with different philosoph-
ical issues regarding mathematics. We will show that mathematics has no on-
tological foundations but rather methodological foundations in the creation of
symmetries. The apparently ontological foundation of mathematics we see in set
theory is merely a special case of a larger kind of mathematical symmetry. The
objectivity of mathematical discourse will fall out of the fact that mathematics
obeys the symmetries we deemed mathematical. The fact that mathematics
works so well in fundamental physics is because the symmetries of physics are
a subset of the symmetries of mathematics. And the reason that mathematics
appears so convincing is that we determined in advance what counts as mathe-
matics. It is thus not surprising that we are so convinced by the fact that the
consequences of our mathematics follow smoothly from our preconceptions of
mathematics.
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This paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2 we briefly describe the prominent
and evolving role that symmetry plays in the development of physics. In Section
3 we discuss the kinds of symmetries found in mathematics. Section 4 uses these
symmetry considerations to address the philosophical questions. Section 5 shows
that some of these ideas can be seen within the area of category theory.
2 The role of symmetry in physics
A reasonable history of physics can be given in terms of the ever-expanding
place for symmetry in understanding the physical world.2 We briefly outline
this expanding history from its origins in the classification of crystals to its role
in explaining and defining all the “laws of nature.”
“Symmetry” was initially employed in science as it is in everyday language.
Bilateral symmetry, for example, is the property an object has if it would look
the same when the left and the right sides are swapped. In general an object
has symmetry if it appears the same when viewed from different perspectives.
A cube thus has six-sided symmetry while a sphere is perfectly symmetrical
because it looks the same from any of its infinite positions.
Pierre Curie formulated one of the earliest symmetry rules about nature.
He showed that if a cause has a certain symmetry, then the effect will have a
corresponding symmetry. Although Curie was mostly concerned with crystals
and the forces that create them, the “Curie Symmetry Principle” has been
employed throughout physics.
Physicists have generalized the term “symmetry” from descriptions of ob-
jects to descriptions of laws of nature. A law of nature exhibits symmetry when
we can transform the phenomena under the scope of the law in certain ways
and still make use of the same law to get a correct result. We say that such a
law is “invariant” with respect to those transformations.
A simple example of a symmetry exhibited by a law of nature is the fact that
the results of an experiment remain correct when the location of an experiment
is changed. A ball can be dropped in Pisa or in Princeton and the time needed
for the ball to hit the ground will be the same (all other relevant factors being
equal). We thus say that the law of gravity is invariant with respect to location.
This fact about locations of experiments was so obvious and taken for granted
that scientists did not notice or articulate it as a type of symmetry for some
time.
Similarly, the laws of nature are invariant with respect to time. A physical
process can be studied today or tomorrow and the results will be the same. The
orientation of an experiment is also irrelevant and we will get identical results
(again, ceteris paribus) regardless of which way the experiment is facing.
2For philosophical introductions to symmetry see the Introduction in [BC03], [BC07],
[BC08] and [Ban12]. For a popular introduction to the physical issues see [LH04]. For an in-
teresting philosophical view of symmetry in biology see [BL11]. One should also read [Lonng]
for a fascinating perspective about symmetry in modern mathematics.
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Classical laws of motion formulated by Galileo and Newton display more
sophisticated symmetries called “Galilean invariance” or “Galilean relativity.”
These symmetries show that the laws of motion are invariant with respect to
an observation in an inertial frame of reference — the laws of motion remain
unchanged if an object is observed while stationary or moving in a uniform,
constant velocity. Galileo [Gal53] elegantly illustrates these invariances describ-
ing experiments that can be performed inside a closed ship. Mathematicians
have formulated this invariance by studying different transformations of refer-
ence frames. A “Galilean transformation” is thus a change from one frame of
reference to another that differs by a constant velocity: x −→ x + vt, where v
is a constant velocity. Mathematicians realized that all these Galilean transfor-
mations form a group which they called the “Galilean group.” In broad terms
then, the laws of classical physics are invariant with respect to the Galilean
group.
To see what it means for laws of physics to be invariant with respect to
Galilean transformations consider the following. Imagine a passenger in a car
traveling a steady 50 miles per hour along a straight line (neither accelerating
nor decelerating). A passenger is throwing a ball up and catching it when it
comes down. To the passenger (and any other observer in the moving car) the
ball is going straight up and straight down. However to an observer standing
still on the sidewalk, the ball leaves the passenger’s hand and is caught by the
passenger’s hand but it does not go straight up and down. Rather the ball
travels along a parabola because the ball goes up and down while the car is
also moving forward. The two observers are not observing different laws of
physics in action. The same law of physics applies to them both. But when the
stationary observer sees the ball leaving the passenger’s hand, it does not only
have a vertical component. Since the car is also moving forward at 50 miles
per hour the ball’s motion has a horizontal component too. The two observers
see the phenomena from different perspectives but the results of the laws must
be the same. Each observer must be able to use the same law of physics to
calculate where and when the ball will land despite the fact that they make
different observations. Thus, the law is invariant with respect to the ability to
swap the two perspectives and still get the same answer. The law is symmetric.
One can view this with the aid of the following commutative diagram:
stationary
observer
,,
calculate
trajectory
""❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋
swap moving
observer
ll
calculate
trajectory
||②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
②②
object’s
location
Galilean Symmetry
The top part shows the ability of the two perspectives to be swapped. Each
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observer can calculate the ball’s trajectory and both of them must come to the
same conclusion about the location of the ball when it lands.
Another way of expressing this is to say that observers cannot determine
whether they are moving at a constant velocity or standing still just by looking
at the ball. The laws of physics cannot be used to differentiate between them
because the laws operate identically from either perspective.
One of the most significant changes in the role of symmetry in physics was
Einstein’s formulation of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR). When consid-
ering Maxwell equations that describe electromagnetic waves Einstein realized
that regardless of the velocity of the frame of reference, light will always appear
to be traveling at the same rate. Einstein went further with this insight and
devised the laws of STR by postulating an invariance: the laws are the same
even when the frame of reference is moving close to the speed of light. He found
the equations by first assuming the symmetry. Einstein’s radical insight was to
use symmetry considerations to formulate laws of physics.
Einstein’s revolutionary step is worth dwelling upon. Before him, physicists
took symmetry to be a property of the laws of physics: the laws happened to
exhibit symmetries. It was only with Einstein and STR that symmetries were
used to characterize relevant physical laws. The symmetries became a priori
constraints on a physical theory. Symmetry in physics thereby went from being
an a posteriori sufficient condition for being a law of nature to an a priori
necessary condition. After Einstein, physicists made observations and picked
out those phenomena that remained invariant when the frame of reference was
moving close to the speed of light and subsumed them under a law of nature.
In this sense, the physicist acts as a sieve, capturing the invariant phenomena,
describing them under a law of physics, and letting the other phenomena go.
The General Theory of Relativity (GTR) advanced the relevance of symme-
try further by incorporating changes in acceleration. Starting with the advent
of GTR Einstein postulated that the laws of nature be understood as invariant
even when acceleration is taken into account, i.e. if the observer is accelerating.
In 1918 symmetry became even more relevant to (the philosophy of) physics
when Emmy Noether proved a celebrated theorem that connected symmetry to
the conservation laws that permeate physics. The theorem states that for every
continuous symmetry of the laws of physics, there must exist a related conser-
vation law. Furthermore, for every conservation law, there must exist a related
continuous symmetry. For example, the fact that the laws of physics are invari-
ant with respect to space corresponds to conservation of linear momentum. The
law says that within a closed system the total linear momentum will not change.
Time invariance corresponds to conservation of energy. Orientation invariance
corresponds to conservation of angular momentum, etc (see e.g. [Fey67] Ch. 4,
[Wei92] Ch VI, and [Ste06] for discussion). Noether’s theorem had a profound
effect on the workings of physics. Whereas physics formerly first looked for
conservation laws, it now looked for different types of symmetries and derived
the conservation laws from them. Increasingly, symmetries became the defining
factor in physics.
The ideas of symmetry were significantly advanced by Hermann Weyl. He
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invented the notion of gauge invariance or gauge symmetry. This is a way of
talking about symmetries of laws that are preserved while moving in spacetime.
They are a type of local symmetry that moves. This turned out to be very
important for almost every branch of physics.
Researchers currently look for and find some of the more interesting examples
of symmetry in particle physics. The field originally postulated three symme-
tries: a parity invariance with respect to space reflection that lets us swap right
and left, a translation from going one way in time to the other, and the charge
replacement of a particle with a corresponding anti-particle. Particle physics
continues the effort to find more and more abstract symmetries. The idea is to
allow the laws of physics to remain the same no matter how the phenomena are
described.
The physicist Victor Stenger unites the many different types of symmetries
under what he calls “point of view invariance.” That is, all the laws of physics
must remain the same regardless of how they are viewed. Stenger ([Ste06])
demonstrates how much of modern physics can be recast as laws that satisfy
point of view invariance. We can visualize this with a generalization of the
previous commutative diagram.
A’s
perspective
,,
calculate
##●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●
swap B’s
perspectivell
calculate
{{✇✇
✇✇
✇✇
✇✇
✇✇
✇✇
✇✇
✇✇
✇✇
result
Point of View Symmetry
The top part shows the ability of the two perspectives to be swapped. Each
perspective can be used to calculate the process of the physical phenomena and
both must get the same result.
Symmetry also plays a role in more speculative areas of physics. Our best
way forward beyond the standard model are attempts to unify all interactions
in nature. One of them, supersymmetry, postulates that there is a symmetry
that relates matter to forces in nature. Supersymmetry requires us to postulate
the existence of a partner matter particle for every known particle that carries
a force, and a force particle for every matter particle. The idea here is that the
laws of physics are invariant if we swap all the matter for all the force. None of
the partner particles have yet been discovered, but because they are mandated
by the symmetries it is what scientists are seeking out.
Symmetry, as we have described it, is only part of the story. In numerous
cases a law of physics actually violates a symmetry law and breaks into several
different laws via a mechanism known as “symmetry breaking.” These broken
symmetries are as conceptually important as the symmetries themselves. The
way a symmetry breaks determines certain constants of nature. But the question
of why a symmetry should break in one way and not another is not presently
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understood. Researchers are at a loss when they leave the constraints set by
symmetry.
Recent excitement over the discovery of the Higgs boson reveals a triumph
of the role of symmetry in physics. Scientists postulated that there was a sym-
metry in place at the time of the big bang, and it was only when this symmetry
was “broken” via the “Higgs mechanism” that it was possible for mass to exist.
By discovering the Higgs boson, physics was able to provide the mechanism by
which mass was produced out of the perfect symmetry of the initial state of
the universe. The Higgs mechanism was postulated only on the strength of the
presumed symmetries.3 The recent discovery of the Higgs boson as the culmi-
nation of an extensive research program has further vindicated the methodology
of postulating symmetries to discover fundamental properties of the universe.
Physics also respects another symmetry, which as far as we know has not
been articulated as such. The symmetry we refer to is similar to the symmetry
of time and place that was obvious for millennia but not articulated until the last
century. Namely, a law of physics is applicable to a class of physical objects such
that one can exchange one physical object of the appropriate type for another
of that type with the law remaining the same. Consider classical mechanics.
The laws for classical mechanics work for all medium sized objects not moving
close to the speed of light. In other words, if a law works for an apple, the law
will also work for a moon. Quantities like size and distance must be accounted
for, but when a law is stated in its correct form, all the different possibilities
for the physical entities are clear, and the law works for all of them. We shall
call this invariance for a law of nature symmetry of applicability, i.e. a law is
invariant with respect to exchanging the objects to which the law is applied.
We shall see later that this is very similar to a type of symmetry that is central
to mathematics.
To sum up our main point, the change in the role of symmetry has been
revolutionary. Physicists have realized that symmetry is the defining property
of laws of physics. In the past, the “motto” was that
A law of physics respects symmetries.
In contrast, the view since Einstein is:
That which respects symmetries is a law of physics.
In other words, when looking at the physical phenomena, the physicists picks out
those that satisfy certain symmetries and declares those classes of phenomena
to be operating under a law of physics. Stenger summarizes this view as follows
“. . . the laws of physics are simply restrictions on the ways physicists may draw
the models they use to represent the behavior of matter” ([Ste06]: 8). They
are restricted because they must respect symmetries. From this perspective, a
physicist observing phenomena is not passively taking in the laws of physics.
Rather the observer plays an active role. She looks at all phenomena and picks
out those that satisfy the requisite symmetries.
This account explains the seeming objectivity of the laws of physics. In order
for a set of phenomena to fall under a single law of physics, it must hold in
3See [Ban08] for a related discussion of the discovery of the Ω− particle.
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different places, at different times, be the same from different perspectives, etc.
If it does not have this “universality,” then it cannot be a law of physics. Since,
by definition, laws of nature have these invariances, they appear independent of
human perspective. Symmetry thus became fundamental to the philosophical
question of the ontology of laws of physics.4
3 The role of symmetry in mathematics
Consider the following three examples:
(1) Many millennia ago someone noticed that if five oranges are combined
with seven oranges there will be twelve oranges in total. It was also noticed
that when five apples are combined with seven apples there is a total of twelve
apples. That is, if we substitute apples for oranges the rule remains true. In a
leap of abstraction, a primitive mathematician formulated a rule that in effect
says 5+7 = 12. This last short abstract statement holds for any objects that can
be exchanged for oranges. The symbols represent any abstract or real entities
such as oranges, apples, or manifolds. A similar commutative diagram can be
used to illustrate this.
statement
about
oranges
,,
evaluate
""❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉❉
❉
exchange
statement
about
apples
ll
evaluate
||③③
③③
③③
③③
③③
③③
③③
③③
③③
truth
value
Symmetry of Fruit Exchange/
Symmetry of Applicability
The top part shows the ability to swap apples for oranges. Each statement can
be evaluated and must produce the same truth value.
(2) Ancient Egyptians studied different shapes in order to measure the earth
so that they can have their taxes and inheritance properly assessed. Their
drawings on papyrus represented shapes that could be used to divide up the
fields on the banks of the Nile. Archimedes could make the same shapes with
sticks in the sand. Drawings can accurately describe properties of these shapes
regardless of what they represent: plots of land, Mondrian paintings, shipping
containers, or whatever.
4Whether or not there are laws of nature at all or whether they should be eliminated in
favor of symmetries is a matter of considerable controversy among philosophers of science. See
van Fraassen ([Fra89]) and Earman [Ear04] for stronger and weaker versions of eliminationist
views on this issue. Our account is agnostic about this.
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In modern times, mathematicians talk about numerous geometrical or topo-
logical theorems such as the Jordan Curve Theorem. This statement says that
any non-self-intersecting (simple) closed continuous curve (like a deformed oval)
in the plane splits the plane into two regions, an “inside” and an “outside.” If
you exchange one curve for another you will change the two regions. The curve
could represent a child’s maze or a complicated biological drawing and the Jor-
dan Curve Theorem still applies.
(3) One of the central theorems in algebra is Hilbert’s Nullstellensatz. This
says that there is a relationship between ideals in polynomial rings and algebraic
sets. The point is that for every ideal, there is a related algebraic set and vice
versa. In symbols:
I(V (J)) =
√
J
for every ideal J . If you swap one ideal for another ideal, you get a different
algebraic set. If you change the algebraic set, you get a different ideal. This
theorem relates the domains of algebra and geometry and is the foundation of
algebraic geometry.
In these examples we made use of ways of changing the semantics (referent)
of mathematical statements. We swapped oranges for apples, changed shapes,
transformed curves, and switched ideals. Our central claim is that this ability
to alter what a mathematical statement denotes is a fundamental property of
mathematics. Of course not all transforms are permitted. If we swap some
of the oranges for some of the apples, for example, we will not necessarily get
the same true mathematical statement. If we substitute a simple closed curve
for a non-simple closed curve (like a figure-8), the Jordan Curve Theorem will
not hold true. Such transformations are not legal. We can only change what
the statement means in a structured way. Call this structured changing that
is permitted a uniform transformation. Our main point is that this uniform
transformation and the fact that statements remain true under such a trans-
formation is a type of symmetry. Recall, a symmetry allows us to change or
transform an object or “law” and still keep some vital property invariant. If a
mathematical statement is true, and we uniformly transform the referent of the
statement, the statement remains true. Mathematical statements are invariant
with respect to uniform transformations. We call the property of mathematical
statements that allows it to be invariant under a change of referent symmetry
of semantics. The truth value of the mathematical statement remains the same
despite the change of semantic content.
Symmetry of semantics can be illustrated with the following familiar dia-
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gram.
mathematical
statement
connoting
A
--
evaluate
##❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
❍❍
uniform
transformation
mathematical
statement
connoting
B
ll
evaluate
{{✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈✈
✈
truth
value
Symmetry of Semantics
The top part shows the ability to swap connotations of mathematical statements
with any two elements of the domain of discourse. Each statement can be
evaluated and must arrive at the same truth value.
Specifically, what types of transformations are uniform transformations?
First, the entities we swap must be part of a certain class of elements. Ev-
ery mathematical statement defines a class of entities which we call its domain
of discourse. This domain contains the entities for which the uniform transfor-
mation can occur. When a mathematician says “For any integer n . . .,” “Take
a Hausdorff space . . . ”, or “Let C be a cocommutative coassociative coalgebra
with an involution . . . ” she is defining a domain of discourse. Furthermore,
any statement that is true for some element in that domain of discourse is true
for any other. A uniform transformation is one in which one element in the
domain is substituted for another. Notice that the domain of discourse for a
statement can consist of many classes of entities. Each statement might have
n-tuples of entities, like an algebraically closed field, a polynomial ring and an
ideal of that ring. Every mathematical statement has an associated domain of
discourse which defines the entities that we can uniformly transform.
Different domains of discourse are indicative of different branches of math-
ematics. Logic deals with the classes of propositions while topology deals with
various subclasses of topological spaces. The theorems of algebraic topology deal
with domains of discourses within topological spaces and algebraic structures.
One can (perhaps naively) say that the difference between applied mathematics
and pure mathematics is that, in general, the domains of discourse for applied
mathematical statements are usually concrete entities while the domains of dis-
course for pure mathematical statements are generally abstract entities.
With the concept of domains of discourse in mind one can see how variables
are so central to mathematical discourse and why mathematicians from Felix
Klein to Tarski, Whitehead ([Epp11]), Leibniz, Frege, Russell, and Peano all
touted their import for mathematics. Variables are placeholders that tell how
to uniformly transform referents in statements. Essentially, a variable indicates
the type of object that is being operated on within the theory and the way to
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change its value within the statement. For example in the statement
a× (b+ c) = (a× b) + (a× c)
which expresses the fact that multiplication distributes over addition, the a
shows up twice on the right side of the equation. If we substitute something
for a on the left, then, in order to keep the statement true, that substitution
will have to be made twice on the right side. In contrast to a, the b and c each
occur once on both sides of the equation. Again, the variables show us how to
uniformly transform the entities.
The values of the variables,5 for us, are mathematical objects. They are any
entities in a domain of discourse defined by a mathematical statement. So or-
anges, apples, and stick drawings in the sand are mathematical objects. As long
as we can transform those objects into other objects within the same domain of
discourse they are mathematical objects. We can transform seven oranges into
the elements of the set 7 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and give equal status to each of
them as mathematical objects. Mathematicians prefer to use 7 because of the
generality it connotes. But this is misleading. Seven oranges are just as good at
representing that number in any mathematical statement. Any statement about
the number seven can be made with a transformation of the elements from the
set of seven oranges.6 The mathematical statements of “applied mathematics”
are no less true than the statements in “pure mathematics”. Concrete models
of mathematical theories are just as good as abstract models.
Symmetry of semantics is not a novel concept. It is familiar to logicians and
model theorists as the definition of validity. A logical formula is valid if it is
true under every interpretation. That is, it must be true for any object in the
domain of discourse. The novelty here consists in considering validity as a type
of symmetry. We shall see that this symmetry is as fundamental to mathematics
as many symmetries are to physics.
So let us now return to the analogy with physics. Rather than understanding
mathematical statements as satisfying symmetry of semantics, we argue that it
is that which satisfies these symmetries that we call mathematics. As with
physics, in the past we understood that:
A mathematical statement satisfies symmetry of semantics.
we now claim that:
A statement that satisfies symmetry of semantics is mathematical.
In other words, given the many expressible statements a mathematician finds,
her job is to choose and organize those that satisfy symmetry of semantics. In
5The function of variables (and types) have a long and interesting history. We are not
saying that the reason for their creation was to foster the notion of symmetry of semantics.
However, variables as they are now, are helpful for dealing with symmetry of semantics. For
more on the history of variables and symbols in mathematics see [Maz14], [HvD10], and
[Ser05].
6Frege’s influence on this definition should be evident. A finite number for Frege consists of
the equivalence class of the finite sets where two sets are equivalent if there is an isomorphism
from one set to another. When we talk of the equivalence class 5 we are ignorant of the set
of the equivalence class under discussion; we may be talking about 5 apples or 5 cars.
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contrast, if a statement is true in one instance but false in another instance, then
it is not mathematics. In the same way that the physicist acts as a “sieve” and
chooses those phenomena that satisfy the required symmetries to codify into
physical law, so too the mathematician chooses those statements that satisfy
symmetry of semantics and dubs it mathematics.
Many statements thereby count as mathematical and many do not. Those
that do not in general do not satisfy symmetry of semantics; statements contain-
ing vague words cannot be mathematical. Even some mathematical-sounding
statements such as “If x is like y and y is like z, then x is like z” simply fail in
most cases because “like” is not exact enough to be part of mathematics.
One may object to this view by saying that allowing mathematics to be
whatever satisfies symmetry of semantics is too inclusive. Many general state-
ments not traditionally thought of as mathematical also satisfy symmetry of
semantics. For example “all women are mortal” is a general non-mathematical
statement whereby any woman can be exchanged with any other in the con-
notation and hence the statement satisfies symmetry of semantics. We agree
that symmetry of semantics can be found in such general statements, though
this is hardly an objection. There is no principled reason to exclude such ap-
plications of mathematics. Many branches of science, like applied mathematics,
make use of general statements with domains of discourse that do not contain
“traditional” mathematical objects. One would be hard pressed to find a good
dividing line between theoretical physics and mathematics, theoretical computer
science and mathematics, etc.7 Many statements in both pure and applied sci-
ences do satisfy symmetry of semantics and to the extent that a branch of science
is mathematical we expect it to have symmetry of semantics.
We stress again, that many general or universal statements are in fact math-
ematics. From our perspective if the statement is strong enough so that it is true
for every element of the implied domain of discourse, then it is mathematics. Nor
do we shirk away from this definition. Mathematics and its many subdisciplines
discuss many different types of objects. No one would say that mathematics
is only about numbers and shapes. It is also about propositions, fluid flows,
connections on vector bundles, chemical bonds, towels, apples, oranges, etc.
Mathematics is about anything where one can reason in an exact manner in
such a way that no element in its domain of discourse is exceptional. One might
object that by this criterion nothing is outside of our definition of mathematics.
This is false. Consider the following statements “all spoons are silverware” and
“all silverware is metal”, “all spoons are metal.” These are general statements
that are not part of mathematics. While it is part of everyday speech — and
would be considered generally true — it is not mathematics. Some spoons are
not silverware. There are plastic spoons that are neither silverware nor metal.
These statements are not exact enough to be part of mathematics. If it was
more exact, then the statements would in fact be part of a logic discussion and
fall under the dominion of mathematics.8
7Mark Steiner ([Ste05]) treats those fields as applications of mathematics.
8Exactness comes from the fact that there are no counterexamples. This, in turn, leads to
symbolization in mathematics. If we can replace one entity by another, we might as well call
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Another symmetry that mathematics has we call symmetry of syntax. This
says that any mathematical object can be described (syntax) in many different
ways. For example we can write 6 as 2× 3 or 2 + 2+ 2 or 54/9. The number pi
can be expressed as pi = C/d, pi = 2i log 1−i
1+i
, or the continued fraction
pi = 3 + 1
7+
1
15+
1
1+
1
292+
1
1+
1
1+
1
1+
. . .
Similarly we can talk about a “non-self-intersecting continuous loop,” “a simple
closed curve,” or “a Jordan curve” and mean the same thing. The point is that
the results of the mathematics will be the same regardless of the syntax we
use. Mathematicians often aim to use the simplest syntax possible, so they may
write “6” or pi instead of some equivalent statement, but ultimately the choice
is one of convenience, as long as each option is expressing the same thing.
It is interesting to note that formal mathematics started with Euclid’s notion
of symmetry. The shapes he discussed were essentially invariant with respect
to size and orientation. He implored us not to be concerned with how large or
small the right triangle was. The important thing was the shape. Similarly for
orientation. We are just taking these notions of invariances to be the defining
notions of mathematics. We have returned to the origins of formal mathematics.
The symmetries mentioned above are not the only ones mathematical state-
ments satisfy. Some symmetries are taken for granted to such an extent that
even mentioning them seems strange. For example, mathematical truths are
invariant with respect to time and space: if they are true now then they will
also be true tomorrow, if they are true in Manhattan they are true on Mars. It
is similarly irrelevant who asserts a theorem or in what language a theorem is
stated, or if it stated at all.
4 Some Philosophical Consequences
Epistemology. Considering that we see mathematics as a function of sym-
metries it is thus natural to think of them as the foundation of mathematics.
But let us explore different conceptions of mathematical foundations one at a
time. An epistemic foundation for mathematics must explain why mathematical
statements are so convincing as compared to other areas of knowledge ([Mar95],
[Azz05]).
On our account, the confidence we have in our mathematics has its origins
in our a prioristic concept of mathematical symmetry. We are certain about
mathematical results because we have decided a priori that the mathematically
tractable entities we deal with are those entities that are amenable to what we
the entity x.
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called uniform transformations. If they are not amenable to such transforma-
tions, then we have no reason to be certain they will behave the way we want
and so we exclude them from mathematics. The fact that we already decided a
priori how mathematics will work allows us to be certain that our results will
turn out the way we expect. We are certain of the outcome because we designed
the rules.
But if certainty in mathematics arises from symmetry considerations and
our symmetry considerations are the same as those in science, shouldn’t our
science provide the same certainty as mathematics? Why are we still less certain
about physics than we are about mathematics? The reason is that science and
mathematics differ in a crucial way. We generally believe that we have captured
all the relevant information in mathematical definitions. In the sciences, it is
possible to be unaware of some physical phenomena that ought to be in our
domain of discourse or we can fail to understand how some phenomena are
captured by a symmetry. This does not happen often in mathematics. To the
extent that it does, it mimics the nature of physics and we realize that we
should have had a corresponding lack of confidence in our mathematical results.
Lakatos’ ([Lak76]) analysis of the Euler characteristic for the polyhedron is an
example of such a case in mathematics. In physics we need look no further than
the anomalies that Newton was unaware of or could not handle. They were
just not subsumed in his system. Einstein found phenomena that were outside
Newton’s domain of objects that he could swap in a universal transformation and
described an even “larger” symmetry that could accommodate them. As long
as there are unexplored phenomena (like the perturbations in the perihelion of
Mercury or near light speed objects were for Newton) our certainty about science
will be lower because we will not know the extent of the domains of discourse
that we can uniformly transform or the relevant symmetry of applicability.
Objectivity. Georg Kreisel is purported to have remarked that the impor-
tant question in the philosophy of mathematics is the apparent objectivity of
mathematical discourse, not the existence of mathematical objects. Mathe-
matical discoveries are sometimes made simultaneously by individuals working
independently and the facts of mathematics are true in all places, times, and
perspectives. This objectivity is often cast in terms of mathematical realism
and has led many to believe in the independent reality of mathematics and its
objects. But we can acknowledge the objectivity of mathematics without be-
ing realists about mathematical objects by understanding the symmetry at the
core of mathematical epistemology. The symmetry we impose reveals that the
objectivity of mathematics is an artifact of the way we have designed mathe-
matics. By selecting only those statements that are invariant with regard to
what a statement is referring to, the mathematician ensures that the statement
is objective and universal. Kant similarly saw mathematical objectivity as a
function of the forms of intuitions about space and time; we understand sym-
metry as the precondition under which mathematics is done. Given a universal
precondition, it is unsurprising that we all agree on the truth of the results. We
thus need not appeal to an underlying reality for the sake of making sense of
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objectivity.
Ontology. The account we have so far given is metaphysically simple. Any
object (traditionally mathematical or otherwise) that can be manipulated in
a uniform transformation is a mathematical object. We have argued that a
mathematical object is any object that is amenable to mathematical treatment.
Both seven apples and seven can occupy a domain of discourse. Occupying a
domain of discourse is the only relevant criteria for the referent of mathemat-
ical statements. That is why it is not odd to assert that “an apple and an
apple are two apples” and we call that a mathematical statement just as we
might call “1 + 1 = 2” a mathematical statement. Moreover, because mathe-
matical discourse appears so much like the discourse of ordinary languages, it
has been generally understood since Frege that as a philosophical desideratum
we preserve the uniform semantics of our mathematical and ordinary languages
([Ben73]). “2 is bigger than 1” has the same structure and truth conditions as
“the Empire State Building is bigger than the Chrysler Building” and we expect
the structural similarities to indicate a similarity in conditions of meaning. And
this is exactly what is done when we allow apples, squares, cars, and numbers
to be mathematical objects. All can be swapped as part of a uniform transfor-
mation so it is unsurprising that our theory of reference looks the same for both
natural language and mathematics.
Having a uniform semantics is one thing, but how to handle the ontological
question? Prominent accounts of mathematical foundationalism claim that all
mathematics can be built out of simpler mathematical stuff. For example some
accounts claim that all mathematical objects can be constructed from sets. On
the present account, mathematics has no foundation other than the method-
ological claims of adherence to the symmetry conditions discussed. If that is
the case, whence the appeal of such accounts that treat “foundation” in con-
nection with mathematics as the ability to show that large parts (or even all)
of mathematics can be phrased in some system, and that system is “primitive.”
Commonly, since many parts of mathematics can be reduced to set theory and
logic, and sets provide a convenient domain of discourse in everyday settings,
set theory is taken to be a good candidate for such a foundational system.
This is presumably analogous to the conception of fundamental physics that
seeks out the particles in which we, in theory, can express our fundamental on-
tological statements. This search for fundamental laws or fundamental particles
is an important part of contemporary physics. But as we have shown, physics
has largely abandoned the idea that programs that search for particles are the
starting points for scientific research and theory. Instead we have the presump-
tion that invariances are fundamental, which in turn allow for the discovery of
fundamental particles. Thus we really only understand the workings of physics
when we look at invariances, not particles. Particles exist, but knowing about
them does not give us insight into the nature of the rest of foundational physics.
Programs regarding the foundations of mathematics began by confusing reduc-
tion and invariance in the same way that physics did before the Einsteinian
shift discussed above. By looking at mathematical “particles” instead of the
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invariances needed to understand them we end up in the same situation as pre-
Einstein physics; we develop accounts that overlook many things. When those
things are discovered the foundational system requires adjustment. Mathemat-
ics is more similar to science than is usually supposed, and thus we must apply
the the same rules to both.
Physics has a number of “fundamental particles.” Mathematics admits a
variety of types of objects that have no reasonable expectation of reducing one
to another (and in many cases it would anyway be unclear what reduces to
what). Moreover, we have no one single kind of object with which to phrase
all the others. The vocabulary of uniform transformations (i.e. the vocabulary
of mathematical methodology) on the other hand is the only way to talk about
both abstract and concrete objects.
Despite the variety of mathematical objects there is still a temptation to
claim sets as the foundation. Set theory, after all, allows for the discussion of
all kinds of objects.
However, the fact that we can even reasonably talk about competing founda-
tions for mathematics, exposes a problem. On the present account, the reason
sets are not foundational is because of the following: although typical mathe-
matics can be reduced to sets, sets do not exhibit the correct kind of expressive
power or display the right kind of symmetries in mathematics to be the fun-
damental “ground”. To the extent that they appear foundational, sets only
display the symmetry of mathematical objects. That is, set theory shows that
all mathematical objects are the same in one way: they can all be “reduced”
to the same thing. Since all mathematical objects are the same there are ways
in which they can be treated similarly. This is akin to showing that all (non-
fundamental) physical objects reduce to fundamental particles, it fails to deal
with of all the other symmetries in nature. As an analogy, recall Frege’s defini-
tion of a finite number. In it, the equivalence class representing the number 7
happens to contain {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. But it also has {T, U, P,W,Q, Y,R}. In-
sisting that sets are fundamental to mathematics is akin to insisting that every
time we use a set with seven elements we use {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. We can do that
but that choice is arbitrary. What is key here is the whole equivalence class and
the isomorphisms between the sets.
Paul Benacerraf ([Ben65]) describes two hypothetical children who are taught
about the natural numbers in different ways. Ernie learns that the natural
numbers 1, 2, 3 . . . are identified with the sets {∅}, {∅, {∅}}, {∅, {∅, {∅}}} . . ..
Johnny learns to identify the natural numbers with the sets {∅}, {{∅}}, {{{∅}}} . . ..
The moral of the hypothetical pedagogy is supposed to be that set theory, for
example, cannot actually make sense of the myriad of “fundamental mathe-
matical properties” because there are an infinite number such of set-theoretical
reductions and there is no single set that corresponds to each number. But on
our account this very concern is a symptom of confusing reduction and invari-
ance, not a problem with a particular view of numbers. Benacerraf’s problem
in other words, is exactly our point. The fact that we can swap {∅, {∅, {∅}}}
for {{{∅}}} in a uniform transformation shows that set theory itself exhibits
symmetry of semantics. However it says nothing about how sets or set theory
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are foundational. The fact that we can swap one set for another and understand
both as 3 is not only unsurprising on our account but expected, because set the-
ory is just another branch of mathematics that exhibits symmetry of semantics,
like all the others. It is symmetry of semantics that is truly fundamental, not
set theory.
Set theory does not show anything fundamental about numbers because it
does not account for how we actually take mathematics to exhibit invariances.
Namely, we take mathematical objects to be invariant in a way that the objects
stay the same under a wide range of rule transformations, not just object trans-
formations. Therefore set theory initially appears intuitively like a ground for
mathematics, but nonetheless fails, because set theory can do one thing that
we expect of a physical reduction, namely exhibit something analogous to an
ontological-type reduction of some mathematical objects. But the reduction is
inadequate as it cannot capture what is really important (what is really math-
ematical) about mathematics.
Therefore, on this way of looking at mathematics, we need not see any branch
of mathematics as ontologically fundamental. The ontology is secondary to what
we take to be the methodological underpinnings of mathematics - the search for
symmetries.
Unreasonable effectiveness. A philosophical naturalist’s interest in the phi-
losophy of mathematics is the alignment of the ontology, epistemology, and
especially methodology of mathematics with those of science. The account we
have given is naturalistic as it has mathematics relying on the same a priori
role of symmetry as fundamental physics. They both take up the idea that
the starting point of inquiry are the postulated symmetries, not the “smallest
pieces.”
Treating mathematics as a function of symmetries also addresses the prob-
lem9 of the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences.
Eugene Wigner articulated his amazement at the fact that the physical science
we discover is shockingly related to the mathematics we need to understand it.
Many times science needs to articulate a physical concept and it turns to math-
ematics; the mathematics is often there. Mark Steiner ([Ste95]: 154) sees one
version of the problem as stemming from the apparent mismatch of methodolo-
gies. How can problems emerging from physics be articulated, and even solved,
using methods that were designed for a completely unrelated purpose? Another
way of looking at it is that if physics and mathematics are both human cre-
ations, with physics designed to work with the world and mathematics designed
independently of its applications to the natural world, what explains how they
work so well together?
A. Zee, completely independent of our concerns, has re-described the prob-
lem as the question of “the unreasonable effectiveness of symmetry consider-
9Various authors (e.g. Mark Steiner ([Ste98]) and Nicolas Fillion ([Fil12])) now distinguish
between various problems of the applicability of mathematics. We confine our remarks to
what we take to be Wigner’s original question ([Wig60]) of why mathematics can be used at
all with respect to the physical world.
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ations in understanding nature.” Though our notions of symmetry differ, he
comes closest to articulating the way we approach Wigner’s problem when he
writes that “Symmetry and mathematics are closely intertwined. Structures
heavy with symmetries would also naturally be rich in mathematics” ([Zee90]:
319).
Understanding the role of symmetry however makes the applicability of
mathematics to physics not only unsurprising, but expected. Physics discovers
some phenomenon and seeks to create a law of nature that subsumes the be-
havior of that phenomenon. The law must not only encompass the phenomenon
but a wide range of phenomena. The range of phenomena that is encompassed
defines a set and it is that set which symmetry of applicability operates on.
(Recall that symmetry of applicability allows us to exchange one object of a
type for another of that type.) So a law must be deliberately designed with
symmetry of applicability. Mathematics has a built in ability to express these
symmetries because the symmetry of applicability in physics is merely a subset
of the symmetry of semantics. That is, the fact that we can exchange one ob-
ject for another object when dealing with a physical law is simply a special case
of exchanging one object for another object in a mathematical statement that
expresses the physical law. There is then nothing surprising about the fact that
there is some mathematics that is applicable to physics, as the symmetries of
physics are a subset of the symmetries of mathematics. Any symmetry we find
in physics should (already) be in mathematics.
For example Newton’s established law regarding the relationship of two bod-
ies is
F = G
m1m2
r2
.
Symmetry of applicability says that m1 can correspond to the mass of an apple
or of the moon and the formula still holds. Symmetry of semantics says that
m1 can be a small number (mass of an apple) or a large number (mass of the
moon).
It is for this reason too that it is odd to say that mathematics is indispens-
able for physics (in the Quine-Putnam sense). Symmetry of applicability (in
physics) is a subset of the mathematical symmetry of semantics. So it is not
that mathematics is indispensable for our best scientific theories, but rather,
they would not be our best scientific theories (or a recognizable scientific theory
at all) if they could not be mathematized.
As we saw, the laws of physics are invariant with respect to the symmetry
of applicability. This means that the laws can apply to many different physical
entities. Symmetry of applicability is a type of symmetry of semantics. In
detail, symmetry of applicability says that a law of nature can apply to many
different physical entities of the same type. Symmetry of semantics says that a
mathematical statement can refer to many different entities in the same domain
of discourse. When a physicist is formulating a law of physics, she will, no doubt,
use the language of mathematics to express this law because she wants the law to
be as broad as possible. Mathematics shares and increases this broadness. The
fact that some of the mathematics could have been formulated long before the
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law of physics is discovered is not so strange. Both the mathematician and the
physicists chose their statements to be applicable in many different contexts.
So it is not that mathematics is unreasonably effective, but rather that if it
were not effective, it would not be mathematics. The unreasonable usefulness
of mathematics is thus no longer mysterious.
Mathematical practice: Our considerations about symmetry would be
immaterial if they were not in line with mathematical practice. They are. The
day-to-day job of the mathematician is proving theorems. Mathematicians do
not generally posit a theorem and then proceed to prove it from axioms. In
reality a mathematician has an intuition and formulates some statement. The
mathematician tries to prove this statement but almost inevitably finds a coun-
terexample. A counterexample is a breaking (violation) of the symmetry of
semantics; there is some element in the supposed domain of discourse for which
the statement fails to be true. The mathematician then proceeds to restrict the
domain of discourse so that such counterexamples are avoided. Again our inde-
fatigable mathematician tries to prove the theorem but fails, so she weakens the
statement. Iterating these procedures over and over eventually leads to a proven
theorem. The final theorem may only vaguely resemble the original statement
the mathematician wanted to prove. In some sense rather than saying that the
“proof comes to the theorem” we might say that “the theorem meets the proof
half way.” The mathematician acting as a “sieve” sorts out those statements
that satisfy symmetry of semantics from those that do not, and only those that
satisfy this symmetry are reported in the final paper. This is just another way of
saying that the day-to-day work of the practicing mathematician involves look-
ing for symmetries. Lakatos’ “rational reconstruction” ([Lak76]) may be cited
as an example of this constant struggle to preserve the symmetry of semantics
of the Euler formula.
As in physics, we observe symmetry on various levels. We see symmetries
being considered when mathematicians construct individual proofs, but also on
the level of the formulation of entire mathematical programs. Symmetries in
physics are discovered by relying on the intuition that there are substantial
domains in which transformations are allowed. It is widely recognized that
one way physics progresses is by unification. Unifying an ever larger amount
of allowable phenomena under a single given law — as when Newton united
terrestrial and planetary mechanics or Weinberg united the weak force and
electromagnetic particle interaction — is how science advances. Similarly in
mathematics; symmetries are discovered when we find that seemingly different
mathematical phenomena are really in the same category as an already known
transformation and are thereby subsumed under a larger domain; we discover
that a new larger class of entities can be uniformly transformed. In other words,
we find that there is a union of different domains of discourses which were
previously assumed to be comprised of non-interchangeable entities.
The field of algebraic topology provides an example of such a unification.
Researchers realized that there is a certain similarity between taking maps be-
tween two topological spaces and taking homomorphisms between two groups.
That is, there is a relationship between topological phenomena and algebraic
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phenomena. Mathematicians went on to use this similarity to try to classify
certain topological structures. Category theory grew out of this unification and
became a tool for much more unification. Category theory has been derided
as “general abstract nonsense” that is “about nothing.” But precisely because
of that, it can be about everything. Hence its language can be used in many
different areas of mathematics. The Langlands program is another example of
unification. Elegantly described by Frenkel ([Fre13]), the Langlands program is
a way of unifying the seemingly different fields of algebraic number theory and
automorphic forms. As with symmetry, such unification advances mathematics
by giving mathematicians an opportunity to discover more general theorems
with wider applications and allows them to apply techniques from one domain
to the other.10 Thus there are various ways in which symmetry considerations
aptly describe mathematical practice in the same way they describe scientific
practice, lending credence to the idea that this is the proper way to look at
mathematics.
5 Category theory and the symmetries of math-
ematics
An important branch of mathematics that deals with changing objects in math-
ematical structures is category theory. In this section we discuss the relationship
of the notions of symmetry of mathematics with the central notions of category
theory. (Knowledge of category theory is not necessary for what follows. Fur-
thermore, this section can be skipped without loss to the philosophical points
we made.)
A category has objects and morphisms. The objects are usually thought
of as mathematical structures and the morphisms are functions between the
objects that preserve some aspect of the structure. For example, the category
of topological spaces has topological spaces as objects and continuous maps
between topological spaces as morphisms. The category of groups has groups as
objects and homomorphisms between groups as morphisms. For any algebraic
structure, there is a category where the objects are those algebraic structures
and the morphisms are functions that preserve some aspect of the structure. In
a sense, morphisms are ways of dealing with changing the structure.
One can think of the morphisms in a category as ways of changing some
elements in the structure. Let A and B be two objects in a category and let
f : A −→ B be a morphism in the category. In a sense, a ∈ A gets placed as
f(a) ∈ B. The fact that the morphism has to preserve the structure, means that
some of the properties of f(a) have to be shared with a. Furthermore, some of
the properties of A have to be shared with B. The strength of the morphism
determines what properties of A are in common with properties of B. Is the
10Philip Kitcher (e.g. [Kit76]) touts the importance of these types of cases for mathematics
and uses them in the service of demonstrating the existence of mathematical explanation.
Emily Grosholz has studied domain unifications in mathematics extensively. See e.g. [Gro00].
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morphism an injection? A surjection? If it is an isomorphism, then A and B
have the same categorical properties.
One of the central ideas of category theory is that particular constructions
are defined by the way morphisms in the category are set up. Most construc-
tions in category theory have “universal properties” that describe the construct
using morphisms in the category. This is similar to our emphasis that the cen-
tral idea of a mathematical structure is what is invariant after changing of the
elements of the structure. One of the leaders in category theory, F. William
Lawvere, summarizes it as follows: “Thus we seem to have partially demon-
strated that even in foundations, not substance but invariant form is the carrier
of the relevant mathematical information” ([Law64]).
In this paper we are pushing the notion that one can determine mathematical
structures and statements by looking at uniform transformations. There is a
very interesting set of ideas in higher algebra and category theory that formalizes
this notion of determining structures by looking at uniform transforms. First,
some preliminaries. In many places in algebra one looks at an ideal structure
and then looks at all the representations / models / algebras of that structure.
For example, one can look at
• a monoid and the category of sets which the monoid acts on,
• a group and the category of representations of the group,
• a ring and its category of modules,
• a quantum group and its monoidal category of representations,
• an algebraic theory and its category of algebras,
• etc.
In all these cases one can easily go from the ideal structure to the category
of representations. There are times, however, when one can go in the reverse
direction. From the category of representations and homomorphisms between
representations we can reconstruct the ideal structure. This is similar to the
main theme of our paper which is about reconstructing an ideal structure by
looking at all the ways objects can be exchanged.
Exactly how such reconstructions are done is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. However, the core idea of the reconstruction theorems are simple and
goes back to the basic definition of what a homomorphism of algebraic struc-
ture is. Consider some algebraic structure and let A and B be representa-
tions/models/algebras of that algebraic structure. If + is a binary operation,
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then f : A −→ B is a homomorphism if the following square commutes:
A×A +A //
f×f

A
f

B ×B
+B
// B.
The reconstructions rest on the idea that the square can be viewed from a
slightly different point of view. The usual motto is that
Homomorphisms are functions that respect all the operations.
We suggest:
Operations are functions that respect all the homomorphisms.
That is, we reconstruct the operations by looking at all those functions that
always respect the ways of changing what we are dealing with. If you can swap
one element for another and the operation still works, then it is a legitimate
operation. In a sense the operations are on equal footing as the uniform trans-
formations.
All these ideas can perhaps be traced back to Felix Klein’s Erlangen Program
which determines properties of a geometric object by looking at the symmetries
of that object. Klein was originally only interested in geometric objects, but
mathematicians have taken his ideas in many directions. They look at the
automorphism group of many structures, e.g. groups, models of arithmetic,
vector spaces, algorithms ([Yan]), etc. In a sense, some of these ideas can be
seen as going back to Galois who determined properties of a structure by looking
at the set of symmetries of the structure.11
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